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Surprise is often defined in terms of disconfirmed expectations, whereby the surprisingness of an event
is thought to be dependent on the degree to which it contrasts with a more likely, or expected, outcome.
The authors investigated the alternative hypothesis that surprise is more accurately modeled as a
manifestation of an ongoing sense-making process. In a series of experiments, participants were given a
number of scenarios and rated surprise and probability for various hypothetical outcomes that either
confirmed or disconfirmed an expectation. Experiment 1 demonstrated that representational specificity
influences the relationship that holds between surprise and probability ratings. Experiment 2 demon-
strated that the inclusion of an enabling event lowers surprise ratings for disconfirming outcomes.
Experiment 3 explored the reason for this effect, revealing that enabling events lower surprise by
reducing uncertainty, thus enhancing ease of integration. Experiment 4 evaluated the contrast hypothesis
directly, showing that differences in contrast are not correlated with differences in surprise. These results
provide converging support for the view that the level of surprise experienced for an event is related to
the difficulty of integrating that event with an existing representation.
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Due to its pervasiveness, surprise has long been a topic of
interest to researchers in psychology and its cognate disciplines
(e.g., Darwin, 1872; Desai, 1939; Shand, 1914). Studies have
shown that, as well as being one of the most basic and universal of
human emotions, surprise has many important cognitive ramifica-
tions (Fisk, 2002; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1998; Meyer, Reisenzein, &
Schu¨tzwohl, 1997; Ortony & Partridge, 1987; Schu¨tzwohl, 1998;
Teigen & Keren, 2003). For example, a surprising event, as well as
giving rise to a “feeling of surprise” at a subjective and physio-
logical level, usually results in an interruption to ongoing activities
and an increased focusing of attention on the event in question
(Schu¨tzwohl & Reisenzein, 1999). Accordingly, it has been hy-
pothesized that surprise plays a key psycho-evolutionary role in
learning and prediction (e.g., Darwin, 1872; Itti & Baldi, 2009;
Meyer et al., 1997).
In recent years, surprise has emerged as an important factor in
a number of different domains, including reasoning (Fisk & Pid-
geon, 1998), persuasion (Petty, Fleming, Priester, & Harasty-
Feinstein, 2001), humor (Alden, Mukherjee, & Hoyer, 2000; Loe-
wenstein & Heath, 2005), advertising (Derbaix & Vanhamme,
2003; Vanhamme, 2000), memory (Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer,
1979; Whittlesea, Masson, & Hughes, 2005), creativity (Boden,
1995), and plausibility (Black, Freeman, & Johnson-Laird, 1986;
Connell & Keane, 2006). However, despite its importance in these
diverse areas, the factors influencing the experience of surprise are
still unclear.
In this article we attempt to shed light on these cognitive
processes by investigating the level of surprise experienced for
outcomes to a range of scenarios. Rather than defining surprise
solely in terms of expectation or anticipation, we consider the
hypothesis that surprise is best explained by examining normal
comprehension processes and how they act to make sense of the
world (see Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Meyer et al., 1997; Pezzo,
2003; Schu¨tzwohl, 1998).
Surprise and Expectation
The intuitive long-standing view of surprise is that it arises
following the occurrence of an unexpected event (e.g., Meyer et
al., 1997; Ortony & Partridge, 1987; Teigen & Keren, 2003). For
example, Bartsch and Estes (1997) have shown that both children
and adults tend to conceptualize surprise in terms of unexpected
events. Typically, expectation is formalized in terms of probabil-
ities, whereby high probability events are seen as expected, and
low probability events are seen as unexpected (and therefore
surprising). Reisenzein (2000) provided support for this view by
demonstrating an inverse linear relationship between surprise and
probability. He presented participants with a series of multiple
choice questions and asked them to indicate the level of confidence
they had in the accuracy of their choice. When subsequently given
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the correct answer, participants’ surprise ratings were found to be
closely correlated with their original confidence ratings.
The Contrast Hypothesis of Surprise
Teigen and Keren (2003) showed that the relationship between
surprise and probability is more complex than people intuitively
assume. They carried out a number of empirical investigations in
which participants rated both the probability of an event and how
surprised they would be if the event were to occur. For example,
in one study participants were presented with a scenario that
described Erik, an athlete who was competing in a 5,000-m race.
One group of participants was told that, with two laps to go, all the
athletes in the race were bunched together (multiple alternatives
condition). Another group was told that Erik was in second place,
lagging behind a lead runner with the rest of the competitors far
behind (single alternative condition). While participants in the
single alternative condition (where Erik was in second place)
correctly rated the probability of Erik winning the race as higher
(M 37.4%) than those in the multiple alternative condition (M
14.1%), they also rated this possibility as more surprising (M
4.16 vs.M 3.96 on a 5-point scale). These findings argue against
the assumption that surprise and probability exhibit a consistent
inverse relationship: Not all low probability events are necessarily
surprising.
To account for their results, Teigen and Keren (2003) proposed
the contrast hypothesis of surprise. This hypothesis holds that
surprise is determined by the contrast between an outcome and an
expectation, rather than by the absolute probability of the outcome
per se. For example, in the scenario where any of the athletes,
including Erik, has a chance of winning the race, the outcome
where Erik wins is unsurprising because it does not contrast with
a more likely alternative. However, when the lead runner is per-
ceived as very likely to win, then the level of contrast between the
observed and the expected outcome is greater, leading to a higher
level of surprise. In their study, Teigen and Keren tested a number
of different manifestations of contrast (e.g., novelty, conceptual
distance) and in each case found that higher levels of contrast were
associated with higher surprise ratings.
Teigen and Keren’s (2003) contrast hypothesis is a significant
departure from the traditional view, in that it demonstrates that
factors other than subjective probability play a key role in surprise.
However, a limitation of this hypothesis is that it can account only
for instances of surprise that involve disconfirmed expectations.
Intuitively, some surprising events are difficult to frame in terms of
contrast. For example, the experience of a rock coming through a
window is likely to be experienced as surprising, even in the
absence of any prior expectations (Ortony & Partridge, 1987). In
order to subsume these alternative forms of surprise into a single
comprehensive theory, a more general explanation is required.
Surprise as a Sense-Making Process
Kahneman and Miller (1986) originally proposed that surprise
reflects a person’s success, or more appropriately their failure, to
make sense of an event. Similarly, Itti and Baldi (2009) have
suggested that surprise should be construed as a measure of the
extent to which an experience forces an observer to change his or
her beliefs about the world. In line with these views, we propose
that the experience of surprise arises when an observed event
causes a previously coherent representation to break down, result-
ing in an urgent representational updating process.
According to this hypothesis, the level of surprise experienced
for an event should be associated with the difficulty of integrating
it with an existing representation. For example, if you found your
house keys were missing, and you had no way of explaining it,
then you might experience a high level of surprise. However, if a
plausible explanation subsequently emerged that allowed the
anomaly to be resolved, such as realizing that you must have left
the keys in the door, then the experience of surprise should
subside. Henceforth, we refer to this view as the integration
hypothesis of surprise, distinguishing it from Teigen and Keren’s
(2003) contrast hypothesis.
Studies investigating the interpretation of narratives have sup-
ported the idea that surprise is linked to ease of integration. Kim
(1999), for example, presented participants with two versions of a
storyline. In the explicit condition, participants viewed the full
story, whereas in the implicit condition a critical explanatory
sentence was omitted. Participants rated the implicit stories as
more interesting than the explicit stories, leading Kim to hypoth-
esize that events that are difficult to integrate lead to higher levels
of surprise; a successful explanation leads to interest, whereas an
unsuccessful explanation leads to a feeling of confusion. In another
study, Hoeken and van Vliet (2000) demonstrated that the level of
surprise experienced for a short narrative can vary depending on
the order in which sentences are presented. They found that when
the presentation order was shuffled to make sentences more diffi-
cult to integrate with each other, surprise levels for the story
increased, again supporting a link between surprise and integra-
tion.
Contrast Versus Integration
Teigen and Keren’s (2003) contrast hypothesis describes sur-
prise in terms of subjective probability. However, rather than
treating subjective probability as an independent explanatory fac-
tor, the integration hypothesis aims to provide a deeper level of
explanation by taking into account the underlying processes that
allow people to make sense of their experiences. Research has
shown that people rely on sophisticated comprehension processes
to construct bridging inferences between extant representations
and observed events, monitoring information on several dimen-
sions, and developing complex relational and causal structures to
facilitate integration (e.g., Connell & Keane, 2006; Gernsbacher,
1990, 1997; Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Rad-
vansky, 1998). It is these processes of construction and integration
that we see as playing a central role in the explanation of surprise.
In most cases, outcomes that contrast markedly with an expec-
tation will also be difficult to integrate, meaning that the contrast
and integration hypotheses will make similar predictions for a
wide range of situations. However, in cases where contrast and
ease of integration happen to differ, such as when an event con-
trasts markedly with an expectation yet can still be easily ex-
plained, the predictions of the contrast and integration hypotheses
will differ.
In this article we describe a series of experiments that explore
the scope and accuracy of the contrast and integration hypotheses.
Experiment 1 examines whether the integration hypothesis can
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account for the differences between surprise and probability ob-
served by Teigen and Keren (2003). Experiment 2 investigates
whether the surprise experienced for an event is mitigated by
providing an enabling event as part of the outcome, while Exper-
iment 3 examines the factors that promote this reduction in sur-
prise. Finally, Experiment 4 tests the contrast hypothesis directly
by correlating contrast and surprise ratings.
Experiment 1
Teigen and Keren’s (2003) contrast hypothesis seeks to explain
why surprise and probability are not always inversely related. The
contrast hypothesis proposes that surprise judgments reflect the
contrast between the probability of an outcome and the probability
of an a priori expectation; an outcome is surprising “because
something else was expected more strongly” (Teigen & Keren,
2003, p. 58). Low probability outcomes that do not contrast with
any higher probability expectation can therefore be judged as
unsurprising, despite being unlikely. The integration hypothesis
provides an alternative explanation. Specifically, it suggests that
differences between surprise and probability judgments emerge
because some low probability outcomes are more easily integrated
than others.
If people insisted on understanding the precise causes behind
every event, then low probability outcomes would always be more
difficult to integrate than higher probability outcomes. However,
given the constraints on time, knowledge, and cognitive resources
that apply to reasoning in real-world environments, people tend to
store information in the form of generalized heuristics rather than
precise causal models (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research
Group, 1999). As a result, they will often generalize low proba-
bility events in terms of frequencies rather than seeking precise
explanatory factors. For instance, rather than scrupulously moni-
toring and modeling the atmospheric conditions that give rise to
precipitation, most people are satisfied to accept that it rains
sporadically. Similarly, in a lottery draw, people will accept that an
unlikely set of random numbers will be drawn, rather than, for
example, furiously trying to explain why the number 36 happened
to emerge on a particular occasion. As a result of these generali-
zations, events can occur that, although recognized as having been
unlikely, do not require representational updating. The integration
hypothesis predicts that when representations are generalized in
this way, low probability events can seem unsurprising.
In the following experiment we investigated whether the inte-
gration hypothesis can account for differences between surprise
and probability judgments. Participants were asked to provide
judgments for four different scenarios involving descriptions of
weather systems. The scenarios varied on two dimensions: gener-
ality and supporting knowledge. The general scenarios involved
descriptions of a weather system that were presented in terms of
frequencies, while the specific scenarios outlined a precise fore-
cast. The supportive scenarios supported the possibility of rain
while the unsupportive scenarios suggested that rain was unlikely.
For each scenario, participants were asked the same questions,
namely, to assess the likelihood of rain the following day (prob-
ability judgment) or to assess how surprising it would be if it
rained the following day (surprise judgment). The aim of the
experiment was to investigate whether the specificity of a repre-
sentation affects the level of surprise experienced for subjectively
low probability events. Because a low probability outcome can be
more easily integrated with a generalized representation, the inte-
gration hypothesis predicts that the general-unsupportive scenario
will seem less surprising than the specific-unsupportive scenario.
Method
Participants. Eighty-four undergraduate students from the
National University of Ireland (NUI), Maynooth participated vol-
untarily in this experiment. All spoke English as a first language.
Materials. Four versions of a weather scenario were gener-
ated. These descriptions varied in their specificity (general vs.
specific) and also in whether the description supported the possi-
bility of rain (supportive vs. unsupportive). Table 1 provides a
summary of the materials.
Design. The design was a 2 (specificity: general or spe-
cific) 2 (supporting: supportive or unsupportive) design, with
both variables within-participant. The dependent measures were
surprise and probability judgments. All participants saw each
scenario and rated the surprise and probability of each.
Procedure. For all scenarios, participants were asked to
provide both surprise and probability judgments for the possibility
of rain the following day. Surprise ratings were provided on a
7-point scale (7 being the most surprising), and probability was
rated in terms of a percentage (100% reflecting certainty). The
order of presentation of the scenarios was randomized between
participants, as was the order in which they rated the surprise and
probability of a given scenario, with half of the participants always
rating surprise first and the other half always rating probability
first.
The objective of the experiment was to examine the relationship
between surprise and probability. However, some of the partici-
pants failed to reason probabilistically. For example, in the sce-
nario “it rains one day a week” (general-supportive), the probabil-
ity of rain on a given day should be 14%, yet some participants
provided much higher probability ratings, suggesting that they had
confused probability with surprise. Accordingly, participants who
produced a probability estimate in excess of 20% for the general-
supportive scenario were excluded from the analysis. This criterion
eliminated a total of 23 participants (27%), 12 of whom had rated
surprise first and 11 of whom had rated probability first.
Table 1
Stimuli for Experiment 1
Scenario type Supportive Unsupportive
General “It rains five days a week.” “It rains one day a week.”
Specific “A cold front approaching from the west will lead to overcast,
unsettled weather over the next few days.”
“An approaching area of high pressure will bring clear, sunny
conditions over the next few days.”
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Results and Discussion
Mean probability and surprise ratings are provided in Table 2.
Overall, the pattern of responding on both measures differs con-
siderably. Although both the general-unsupportive and the
specific-unsupportive scenarios were rated as similarly improbable
(15% and 16%, respectively), the specific-unsupportive scenario
was rated far more surprising than the general-unsupportive sce-
nario (Ms 5.2 and 2.6, respectively).
A series of 2 2 repeated-measures analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) were conducted to examine the relationship between
specificity, probability, and surprise. For the probability ratings,
the interaction between specificity and supportiveness was not
significant, indicating that probability was not affected by repre-
sentational specificity, F(1, 58) 0.24, p .63, MSE 179.62.
There was a significant main effect of supportiveness, F(1, 58)
2,360.67, p .001, MSE 97.95, with the supportive scenarios
(M 77.81%, SD 14.69) receiving higher probability ratings
than the unsupportive scenarios (M 15.20%, SD 9.42). There
was no significant effect of specificity, F(1, 58) 1.02, p .32,
MSE 174.69, indicating that the outcomes for the general (M
45.63%, SD 32.62) and specific scenarios (M 47.37%, SD
34.86) received similar probability ratings.
The surprise ratings displayed a different pattern of results. In
this case, there was a strong interaction between specificity and
supportiveness, F(1, 58) 70.19, p .001, MSE 1.24, indi-
cating that the effect of support on surprise ratings varied depend-
ing on the specificity of the scenario: While the specific-
unsupportive scenario was rated as very surprising (M 5.18,
SD 1.57), the general-unsupportive scenario was rated as much
less surprising (M 2.59, SD 1.45). Again, there was a reliable
main effect of supportiveness, F(1, 58) 186.47, p .001,
MSE 1.74, with the outcomes for the supportive scenarios (M
1.54, SD 1.08) being rated as more surprising than those for the
unsupportive scenarios (M 3.89, SD 1.99). There was also a
reliable main effect of specificity, F(1, 58) 100.97, p .001,
MSE 1.12, with the specific scenarios (M 3.41, SD 2.27)
being rated as more surprising than the general scenarios (M
2.02, SD 1.34).
These results demonstrate that generalized descriptions can lead
to lower levels of surprise for subjectively low probability out-
comes. Although participants acknowledged that it was unlikely to
rain the following day in the general-unsupportive scenario (15%),
they would not have been surprised if it did rain (2.6 out of 7). This
observation is in line with the integration hypothesis, as the oc-
currence of rain on a particular day is compatible with the repre-
sentation that “it rains one day each week” and should therefore
not seem surprising. In contrast, when specific information is
given suggesting fine weather, the occurrence of rain is more
difficult to integrate, leading to higher surprise ratings (5.2),
though not necessarily lower probability ratings (16%).
The observed pattern of results suggests that differences be-
tween surprise and probability can be attributed to the specificity
of the representations on which these judgments are based. Gen-
eralized representations facilitate the integration of subjectively
low probability events, while specific representations are less
likely to be compatible with low probability events, leading to
differences in ease of integration and hence surprise.
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 establish that the integration
hypothesis provides a viable alternative to Teigen and Keren’s
(2003) contrast hypothesis. Nevertheless, the results are still po-
tentially compatible with the contrast hypothesis. For example, it
could reasonably be argued that the specific-unsupportive repre-
sentation contradicts the expectation that there will be clear, sunny
weather, while the other three scenarios do not contradict any
expectations. Because events that contrast with prior expectations
also tend to be difficult to integrate, the integration and contrast
hypotheses will often make similar predictions. In the following
experiment we examine surprise judgments for a range of scenar-
ios where the predictions of the integration and contrast hypothe-
ses differ.
Experiment 2
The main distinction between the contrast and integration hy-
potheses centers on the source of explanation that is provided for
the experience of surprise. The contrast hypothesis maintains that
surprise is determined principally by the contrast between an
expectation and an outcome. On the other hand, the integration
hypothesis proposes that both expectation and surprise are deter-
mined by more fundamental comprehension processes. Thus,
while there might tend to be an association between contrast and
surprise, this should not apply when an outcome violates an
expectation yet can be easily explained. For example, imagine a
situation where you hear the phone ringing. Lifting up the receiver,
you strongly expect to hear a particular colleague on the other end
of the line. However, it turns out to be an old friend. The moment
you hear your friend’s voice you remember having previously
arranged for her to call you at this time. Thus, although the identity
of the caller contrasts markedly with an a priori expectation, you
experience no surprise, because the outcome is easily reconciled
with your existing representation.
The following experiment investigates the prediction of the inte-
gration hypothesis that events can simultaneously violate expectations
and be judged as unsurprising, provided some effective way of ratio-
nalizing those events is established. For example, in Teigen and
Table 2
Mean Probability and Surprise Ratings for Experiment 1
Condition
General supportive General unsupportive Specific supportive Specific unsupportive
Probability Surprise Probability Surprise Probability Surprise Probability Surprise
Probability first 77% 1.3 15% 2.6 83% 1.6 17% 5.1
Surprise first 76% 1.6 14% 2.6 76% 1.6 15% 5.2
M 77% 1.5 15% 2.6 79% 1.6 16% 5.2
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Keren’s (2003) example, although it might be surprising to hear that
Erik won the race, it should seem less surprising when a convincing
explanation is provided (e.g., hearing that the lead runner stumbled).
While the integration hypothesis predicts that surprise ratings should
be lower when an enabling factor is provided as part of the outcome,
the contrast hypothesis does not predict any such effect, since the level
of contrast between expectation and outcome remains the same.
A series of scenarios were devised that instantiated an expectation
about a particular outcome event (e.g., “Anna sets her alarm clock for
7 a.m.” supports the outcome that “The alarm clock rings at 7 a.m. and
wakes Anna”). Three main versions of each scenario were used along
with a fourth control condition. In the confirm condition, the outcome
event was the predictable one that confirmed the expectation set up by
the scenario body. In the disconfirm condition, the outcome event
contradicted the expectation (e.g., “The alarm clock failed to ring at
7 a.m.”). In the disconfirm-enabled condition, the same disconfirming
outcome was presented along with supporting knowledge that ex-
plained why the unexpected outcome might have occurred (e.g., “A
power cut occurred during the night”). Finally, the disconfirm-control
condition paired the disconfirming outcome with an irrelevant control
event (see Table 3).
Because the same expectations and disconfirming outcomes are
inherent to all three disconfirming conditions, each involves the
same level of contrast with a priori expectations. Thus, according to
the contrast hypothesis, all three disconfirming conditions should be
judged equally surprising. On the other hand, the integration hypoth-
esis predicts that surprise ratings will be lower when the integration of
the outcome is easier. The disconfirm-enabled condition should there-
fore be perceived as less surprising than the disconfirm condition,
because it offers the reader a rationalization for why the unexpected
event occurred, making it easier to integrate.
Method
Participants. Fifty-two undergraduate students from Univer-
sity College Dublin participated voluntarily in the experiment. All
participants spoke English as a first language.
Materials. Sixteen event scenarios were constructed, with
four variants for each of the conditions. One of the materials was
based on Teigen and Keren’s (2003) race scenario.
Design. The four conditions were counterbalanced across
four lists of scenarios. Each participant was given one of these lists
containing the 16 items with one of the four endings. Thus, the
design was within-participant, with each participant rating four
scenarios from each condition.
Procedure. Participants were given a booklet containing the
16 scenarios, with instructions for the experiment displayed on the
first page. They were informed that a number of everyday scenar-
ios would be presented and that they were required to rate how
surprised they would be if a certain event, or series of events,
followed on from that scenario. An example was provided to
demonstrate the nature of the task. Each scenario body was pre-
sented on a separate page, with the words “How surprised would
you be if:” followed by the outcome of one of the four experi-
mental conditions. Participants were required to rate their level of
surprise for each event on a 7-point scale (with 7 being the most
surprising). The scenarios were presented in a different random
order to each participant.
Results and Discussion
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out. The
sphericity assumption was satisfied, 2(5, N 52) 7.35, p
.20. The results revealed a significant difference in surprise ratings
across conditions, both by participants, F1(3, 153) 134.40, p
.01, MSE 0.86, and by items, F2(3, 45) 107.80, p .01,
MSE 0.33. Post hoc analysis using Bonferroni adjustments (all
ps .0083) showed that, as one would expect, surprise ratings for
the confirm condition (M 1.88, SD 0.40) were reliably lower
than the ratings in the three disconfirming conditions. The surprise
ratings for the disconfirm (M 4.95, SD 0.91) and disconfirm-
control (M 5.04, SD 0.68) conditions were not reliably
different, indicating that the addition of an irrelevant event had no
effect on perceived surprise for an unexpected outcome. However,
ratings for the disconfirm-enabled condition (M 4.46, SD
0.49) were significantly lower than those for both the disconfirm
(Cohen’s d 0.67) and disconfirm-control conditions (d 0.97).
In sum, the results of Experiment 2 support the integration
hypothesis, in that they reveal that the same unexpected event is
not always judged as equally surprising in different contexts:
When people are provided with a reason for why an unexpected
event might have occurred, their surprise is lower than when the
event is presented in isolation.
Experiment 3
The results of the previous experiment reveal that surprise can
be mitigated by the provision of supporting knowledge in the form
of an enabling event, supporting the proposed link between sur-
prise and sense making. Experiment 3 investigates the precise
Table 3
Sample Scenario Items Used in Experiment 2 Showing the Four Versions of a Given Item
Scenario body: Anna has a very important job interview in the morning. She has to get up far earlier than usual, so she makes sure to set her
alarm clock radio for 7 a.m.
How surprised would you be if . . . ?
Condition Outcome
Confirm The alarm clock woke her up at 7 a.m.
Disconfirm The alarm clock failed to ring at 7 a.m.
Disconfirm enabled There was a power cut during the night and the alarm clock failed to ring at 7 a.m.
Disconfirm control She had a quiet, good night’s sleep and the alarm clock failed to ring at 7 a.m.
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mechanism by which enabling events serve to lower surprise. One
possibility is that the inclusion of supporting knowledge allows
participants to identify plausible explanations that they would not
otherwise have considered. Another possibility is that the effect is
due to a reduction in uncertainty: The identification of one partic-
ular explanation from a set of possible explanations may serve to
lower surprise because it increases the confidence with which a
disconfirming event can be integrated. In order to differentiate
between these two possibilities, we investigated whether the act of
explicitly generating an explanation for an outcome lowers sur-
prise ratings.
Method
Participants. Ninety-five undergraduate students from Uni-
versity College Dublin voluntarily took part in this experiment. All
participants spoke English as a first language.
Materials. The same 16 scenarios were used as in the previ-
ous experiment.
Design. The experiment involved three groups of participants.
The control group was asked to read each scenario and indicate how
surprising they found the final event, while the generative group was
asked to provide an explanation for the outcome before rating it for
surprise (e.g., “Why do you think the alarm clock failed to ring at
7 a.m.?”). Each participant in these two groups was randomly
assigned to read six disconfirming and six confirming scenarios. A
third conjunction group was given the same disconfirming and
confirming scenarios, presented in conjunction with the dominant
enabling event provided by the generative group. In light of the
findings of Experiment 2, we expected that the surprise ratings for
this group would be lower, given the inclusion of an enabling event
as part of the outcome. The principal aim of the experiment was to
ascertain whether the same drop in surprise ratings would be
evident for the generative group, in which participants produced
the explanation themselves. The experiment involved a 3 (group)
2 (outcome) design, with group as a between-participant factor
and outcome as a within-participant factor.
Procedure. In the control and generative conditions partici-
pants rated surprise as in previous experiments. Those in the
generative group were first instructed to write down a plausible
explanation for the outcome. These responses were divided into
thematic categories, and the dominant explanation (i.e., most fre-
quently produced) for each of the scenarios was identified.
The dominant explanations were then presented alongside the
original outcome to the conjunction group. For example, the most
commonly generated response for the alarm clock example was
“Because the batteries in the alarm clock ran out.” For the con-
junction group, this explanation was added to the outcome to
become “The batteries in the alarm clock ran out and the alarm
clock failed to ring at 7 a.m.” Conjunctive outcomes were then
rated for surprise, as in Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion
A 2 3 mixed ANOVA was computed for the by-participants
analysis, and a 2 3 repeated-measures ANOVA was computed
for the by-items analysis. The sphericity assumption was satisfied
for both group, 2(2, N 95) 2.38, p .30, and for the
interaction with outcome, 2(2, N 95) 0.09, p .95. These
analyses revealed a significant interaction between group and
outcome, F1(2, 92) 7.44, p .001, MSE 0.41; F2(2, 30)
85.92, p .0001, MSE 0.20. As expected, a significant differ-
ence in outcome was observed, F1(1, 92) 827.54, p .0001,
MSE 0.41; F2(1, 15) 48.02, p .0001,MSE 0.24, whereby
the surprise ratings for the confirming scenarios (M 1.91, SD
0.54) were reliably lower than those for the disconfirming scenar-
ios (M 4.69, SD 0.54). There was also a significant main
effect of group, F1(2, 92) 7.58, p .001, MSE 0.79; F2(2,
30) 10.56, p .001, MSE 0.15. Post hoc analysis using
Bonferroni adjustments ( ps .0083) showed that the conjunction
group (M 3.97, SD 0.61) gave significantly lower surprise
ratings on average than both the control (M 5.01, SD 0.69,
d 1.59) and the generative groups (M 4.84, SD 0.59, d
1.45) for unexpected outcomes. There were no significant differ-
ences between the three groups for the confirming scenarios (see
Figure 1).
These results show that when participants were asked to gener-
ate an explanation for an unexpected event, their level of surprise
was unaffected. However, when presented with that same expla-
nation as part of the outcome to be evaluated, their level of surprise
was reliably lower. The explanations provided by the generative
group were clearly effective at explaining the disconfirming
events, as demonstrated by the lower surprise ratings for the
conjunction group. If participants in the generative group could
successfully generate explanations for the disconfirming events,
then why did they remain surprised?
One possibility is that the quality of the dominant explanation
presented to the conjunction group was superior to the average
quality of explanation provided by the generative group. However,
the mean surprise ratings provided for dominant explanations
(M 4.82, SD 0.68) were not significantly different from the
mean surprise ratings provided for alternative subdominant expla-
nations (M 4.94, SD 0.69), t(1, 15) –0.69, p .50,
suggesting that the difference between the generative and conjunc-
tion conditions was not due to the failure of some participants to
identify satisfactory explanations. We recomputed the contrast
between the generative and conjunction conditions, this time in-
cluding only those surprise ratings involving dominant explana-
tions. Again, the difference was significant, both by participants
and by items, F1(1, 57) 7.14, p .01,MSE 1.11; F2(1, 15)
48.07, p .01,MSE 0.12, d 0.51, indicating that the observed
Figure 1. Surprise ratings in Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95%
confidence interval of the mean.
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effect reflects a difference between generating an explanation and
being presented with an explanation as part of an outcome.
These results suggest that the provision of an enabling event
lowers surprise by reducing the uncertainty associated with the
explanation, rather than by allowing participants to identify expla-
nations they would not otherwise have considered. Disconfirming
events can present a multitude of possible explanations, some more
surprising than others. For example, an alarm clock failing to ring
could be due to a power cut, a failure of batteries, somebody
setting it incorrectly, or something even more bizarre like water
from a leak in the roof damaging the clock. In order for a discon-
firming event to be successfully integrated, a single set of causal
factors must be reliably identified. An uncertain explanation that is
incorrectly assumed to be accurate could undermine the reliability
of a representation, leading to a larger discrepancy down the line.
On the other hand, an uncertain explanation that remains uncertain
will restrict the potential for subsequent events to be integrated
with confidence. The results indicate that speculating as to why
something might have happened is not good enough for lowering
surprise; the successful integration of a discrepant event requires
the elimination of uncertainty as to its cause.
Representing Uncertainty
In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that differences in represen-
tational specificity can affect the relationship between surprise and
probability, in that low probability events can sometimes be un-
surprising. The results of Experiment 3 have highlighted an addi-
tional distinction between these two measures: Despite being less
probable, outcomes that are more specific can lower surprise by
reducing uncertainty. In probability theory, the more general a
proposition, the more likely it is to be validated due to its greater
scope (e.g., it is more likely to be sunny tomorrow than sunny and
warm because there are some sunny days that are not warm).
However, the results of Experiment 3 indicate that, when judging
surprise, people are not influenced by scope. Instead, they evaluate
a proposition by treating it as a deterministic instance and gauging
how easily it can be integrated with their existing knowledge.
Many studies have highlighted that people often fail to reason
probabilistically (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Krauss &
Wang, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The current set of
experiments has reinforced this observation. In Experiment 1, we
found that a sizeable proportion of participants (27%) were unable
to reason probabilistically when given simple frequency informa-
tion. As shall be seen in the following section, a strong conjunction
fallacy effect was also observed in Experiment 4, whereby the
probabilities of 15 of 16 conjunctive outcomes were rated as more
probable than the corresponding disconfirming outcome presented
in isolation. These findings suggest that people may have a ten-
dency to adopt the sense-making approach when making proba-
bility judgments. In other words, people may be prone to judging
the likelihood of an event by evaluating how surprised they would
be if it did happen, rather than by considering all the different ways
in which it might happen (see Shackle, 1969).
Why should people adopt a sense-making approach for judging
likelihood? One reason might be that probability theory is of
limited use in everyday situations: To use it, one must delineate a
discrete number of possibilities, each of which can be quantified in
some way. In reality, the range of possible explanations for an
event is often difficult to enumerate, and appropriate frequency
information might not be available (e.g., there are many potential
explanations for why an alarm clock may have failed to work, and
people are unlikely to have stored statistics regarding previous
alarm clock failures). Furthermore, maintaining a probabilistic
representation means that new information needs to be assessed
according to its effect on multiple hypothetical scenarios, as op-
posed to a single scenario. This approach may not be feasible in
real-world situations where the range of possible explanations is
unconstrained. Thus, when evaluating complex scenarios, it may
make more sense to base judgments of likelihood on the extent to
which the occurrence of an event would necessitate the updating of
one’s existing beliefs about the world, as opposed to carrying out
a more quantitative assessment.
Research has shown that when faced with uncertainty, people tend
to consider only one hypothesis at a time, thus avoiding the complex-
ity of maintaining a probabilistic representation (see Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 2002). In everyday life, the use of a single deterministic
representation works well. Because events occurring in the physical
world are themselves deterministic, people can adopt a proactive
information-seeking approach to mitigate uncertainty, thus elimi-
nating the need to reason probabilistically. Rather than developing
and maintaining multiple hypotheses for a surprising event, people
can instead actively seek out additional information to establish the
cause. For example, consider the highly unusual event of finding a
penguin inside one’s car. In such a case one might choose to
develop a complex mental model capturing all the possible ways in
which such an unusual event could have unfolded. Alternatively,
one could circumvent this complex task by adopting the
information-seeking approach and phoning the local zoo to de-
mand an explanation. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that
people seek to maintain representations that are founded on con-
firmed truths rather than reflecting the uncertainty of their own
personal knowledge, thus providing further support for a sense-
making role of surprise.
Experiment 4
The previous experiments have provided support for the inte-
gration hypothesis by demonstrating, first, that it can account for
the relationship between probability and surprise and, second, that
the hypothesis makes accurate predictions about how enabling
events influence surprise ratings. However, it could still potentially
be argued that these findings are compatible with Teigen and
Keren’s (2003) contrast hypothesis. Specifically, it could be ar-
gued that having an explanation for a disconfirming event lowers
the perceived level of contrast between that event and the expected
outcome, because the availability of an explanation makes the
outcome seem more likely. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) dem-
onstrated that a conjunction of associated propositions is often
rated as more probable than either proposition in isolation (even if
such ratings are not logically consistent). Thus, knowing that an
alarm clock failed to ring because of a power failure may appear
to reduce the level of contrast with the expectation that it should
have rung at the appropriate time.
The key difference between the contrast and integration hypoth-
eses centers on whether surprise is derived from contrasts or from
more fundamental comprehension processes. Our previous exper-
iments have provided support for a link between ease of integra-
182 MAGUIRE, MAGUIRE, AND KEANE
tion and surprise ratings. In the following experiment we turn our
attention to the contrast hypothesis, directly examining its claim
that surprise ratings are associated with differences in contrast.
One limitation of Teigen and Keren’s (2003) study was that they
did not provide any specific measurements of contrast. In each
experiment, a single scenario was presented to participants involv-
ing a pair of conditions that were assumed to reflect high and low
levels of contrast. Although Teigen and Keren reported reliable
differences, no measure was provided of the overall correlation
between contrast and surprise. In the following experiment we
addressed this lacuna by deriving levels of contrast for the 16
scenarios used in the previous experiments. Teigen and Keren
(2003) stated that the “surprise associated with an outcome is
determined by the relative, rather than absolute probabilities in-
volved” (p. 58). Accordingly, contrast was calculated by subtract-
ing the probability ratings for the confirming and disconfirming
outcomes, allowing the variables of contrast and surprise to be
compared.
Method
Participants. One hundred undergraduate students from NUI
Maynooth participated voluntarily in the experiment. All spoke
English as a first language. Participants were randomly assigned to
rate either surprise or probability, with 40% rating surprise and
60% rating probability.
Materials. The same 16 event sequences as in Experiment 2
were used with five conditions, two of which involved surprise
ratings (disconfirm-S and disconfirm-enabled-S) and three of
which involved probability ratings (expectation-P, disconfirm-P,
and disconfirm-enabled-P). In the disconfirm and disconfirm-
enabled conditions, participants were presented with the original
scenarios and asked to provide either surprise or probability ratings
for the associated outcomes. In the expectation-P condition, par-
ticipants were asked to write down the most likely outcome and
then to rate the probability of this outcome.
Design. The two surprise conditions were counterbalanced
across two lists of scenarios, and the three probability conditions
were counterbalanced across three lists of scenarios. Each partic-
ipant was randomly given one of these lists that contained all of the
16 scenarios.
Procedure. Participants were provided with a booklet con-
taining the 16 scenarios, with instructions for the experiment
displayed on the first page. For the surprise conditions, the sce-
nario body was followed by the question “How surprised would
you be if:” and then the event, or series of events, corresponding
to one of the two possible outcomes. In the disconfirm-P and
disconfirm-enabled-P conditions, the scenario body was followed
by the question “What is the probability that:”, while for the
expectation-P condition participants were instructed to “State what
you think is most likely to happen next:” followed by “What is the
probability of this event occurring?” As in previous experiments,
surprise ratings were provided on a 7-point scale, and probability
was rated in terms of a percentage. The scenarios were presented
in a different random order to each participant.
Results and Discussion
In line with previous experiments, the provision of supporting
knowledge in the form of an enabling event reduced surprise
ratings given for the unexpected outcome: The mean surprise
ratings for the disconfirm-S and disconfirm-enabled-S conditions
were 5.07 and 4.21, respectively. A repeated-measures ANOVA
showed that the disconfirm-enabled-S condition was rated as reli-
ably less surprising than the disconfirm-S condition, F(1, 15)
28.38, p .001, MSE 0.21.
The mean probability ratings for the unexpected outcome in the
expectation, disconfirm-P, and disconfirm-enabled-P conditions
were 76.2%, 15.2%, and 24.2%, respectively. In 15 of the 16
scenarios, the mean probability rating for the disconfirm-enabled-P
condition was higher than that for the disconfirm-P condition. The
difference in mean probability ratings between the two conditions
was reliable, F(1, 15) 37.49, p .001, MSE 18.02.
Contrast was computed by subtracting the probabilities in the
disconfirming conditions from those in the expectation-P condi-
tion. As a result of the conjunction fallacy effect, the average level
of contrast between the expectation-P and disconfirm-P scenarios
was greater than the average level of contrast between the
expectation-P and disconfirm-enabled-P scenarios (61.0% and
51.2%, respectively). This finding suggests that supporting knowl-
edge can indeed alter the subjective probability of an unexpected
outcome, an effect that could potentially have allowed the contrast
hypothesis to accommodate the findings of the previous experi-
ments. However, more detailed correlation and regression analyses
did not support this possibility.
In order to get a sense of what factors predict surprise ratings,
we performed various correlations involving surprise, probability,
and contrast probability. Overall, the correlation between the sur-
prise and probability ratings given for the unexpected outcomes
was negative and significant, r(30) –.52, p .003. However, the
predictions of the contrast hypothesis were not supported: There
was no significant correlation between surprise and contrast,
r(30) .30, p .099, or between surprise and expectation
probability, r(30) –.34, p .054. Indeed, when a stepwise
multiple regression was computed, with surprise ratings as the
criterion variable and unexpected outcome probability, expectation
probability, and contrast as the predictor variables, only unex-
pected outcome probability entered into the model. Thus, as re-
gards predicting surprise ratings, neither expectation probability
nor contrast provided any additional predictive value.
These results undermine the contrast hypothesis’s claim that
contrast is a reliable predictor of surprise: The surprisingness of a
low probability event does not appear to be affected by the prob-
ability of the most likely alternative. Consider, for example, one of
the experimental scenarios in which the protagonist, Sarah, goes to
her parents’ house and knocks on the front door. Because one or
other of her parents must open the door, the probability of the most
likely outcome cannot exceed 50% (assuming no bias toward
either parent). Although this substantially lowers the potential
contrast with any alternative outcome, it does not necessarily lower
the surprise for a low probability event: A stranger opening the
door seems just as surprising, regardless of the probability of the
most likely possible alternative. One might claim that the expec-
tation in this case is that one or other of Sarah’s parents will
answer the door and that the level of contrast should be computed
on this basis (indeed, this is the expected event stated by the
majority of participants). However, in order to make this argument,
one would have to concede that expectations can be general rather
than explicit. This is, in effect, what the integration hypothesis
183MAKING SENSE OF SURPRISE
proposes: Rather than developing explicit expectations about ex-
actly what is going to happen, people instead maintain generalized
representations that can accommodate a broad range of potential
outcomes. The level of surprise experienced for an event depends
on how easily that event can be integrated with the generalized
representation that is intended to support it.
The issue of expectation specificity is the key issue on which the
contrast and integration hypotheses disagree. Teigen and Keren’s
(2003) contrast hypothesis implies that expectations involve ex-
plicit events, whose probability can be quantified and subsequently
contrasted against that of outcome events. On the other hand, the
integration hypothesis maintains that people do not form explicit
expectations about how a sequence of events will pan out. Instead,
they maintain a generalized representation that can be used to
make sense of events but that does not commit to predicting one
outcome in particular. Outcomes must be reconciled with extant
representations via sophisticated comprehension processes, and it
is the difficulty of this integration process that determines the level
of surprise. Accordingly, we have argued that the contrast that
results between an outcome and a generalized representation is
more meaningfully described in terms of an integrative process.
General Discussion
At the outset, we saw that, traditionally, surprise has been
defined in terms of disconfirmed expectations. From this funda-
mental insight, it is a short step to operationalize unexpectedness
in terms of subjective probability, thereby linking the surprise
response to low probability events. However, the work of Teigen
and Keren (2003) has shown the picture to be somewhat more
complex. They revealed that, in some cases, contrasts between
expected and unexpected events (e.g., probability, novelty, or
similarity) can provide a more accurate prediction of people’s
surprise ratings. This work opened the door to a radical reassess-
ment of surprise that takes us from a pure, probabilistic description
to a more comprehension-based approach that is reflected in sev-
eral distinct lines of research (e.g., Hoeken & van Vliet, 2000;
Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kim, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997; Pezzo,
2003; Schu¨tzwohl, 1998; Schu¨tzwohl & Reisenzein, 1999).
The present work belongs to this emerging effort, in that it
advances a sense-making account of surprise. This approach does
not deny that surprise is a response to unexpected events (which
can also be described as low probability events), but it sees the
phenomenon as being most accurately described in terms of a
natural comprehension process. Indeed, we would argue that the
understanding of what it means for an event to be “unexpected” or
“low probability” flows from a consideration of how that event is
processed, represented, and ultimately integrated with an unfold-
ing scenario. Because the sense-making approach can account for
how subjective probabilities are derived in the first instance, it
therefore provides a more fundamental framework from which to
develop an understanding of surprise.
In this article we have shown that differences between surprise
and probability, which Teigen and Keren’s (2003) contrast hypoth-
esis was originally formulated to explain, can be accounted for by
differences in ease of integration. A low probability outcome
seems less surprising when integrated with a generalized scenario
description than with a specific scenario description (Experiment
1). In addition, we have investigated a range of sense-making-
based experimental manipulations that were not invited by the
probability view. We have shown that when enabling events are
presented as part of an unexpected outcome, surprise ratings drop,
despite the fact that that probability is also lowered (Experiment
2). Our findings suggest that this effect arises because the inclusion
of an enabling event reduces the uncertainty involved in identify-
ing a valid explanation, thereby facilitating integration (Experi-
ment 3). Finally, we have demonstrated that when surprise and
subjective probability are assessed side by side in a controlled
manner, contrasts in probability are not a good predictor of sur-
prise ratings (Experiment 4). When taken together, the results of
these experiments support the premise that the sense-making ac-
count provides a more accurate picture of surprise than does the
probabilistic account.
The Utility of Surprise
An important strength of the integration hypothesis is that it
presents a clear rationale for the utility of the surprise response,
namely, that it serves to facilitate the process of representational
integration in cases where discrepancies arise. Heightened arousal
allows attention to be focused on an anomalous event and also
motivates people to resolve any inconsistencies in their under-
standing. Distinctive changes in facial expression associated with
the surprise response, such as eye widening and opening of the
mouth, may serve to promote the intake of sensory information.
For example, Susskind et al. (2008) found that people with wide-
open eyes detected peripheral objects more quickly and performed
side-to-side eye movements faster. The enlargement of the nasal
cavity also enhanced the absorption of odors, as well as allowing
people to take in more air with each breath.
In addition to facilitating integration, we suggest that the expe-
rience of surprise plays an important cognitive role in driving
people to develop and maintain accurate representations of the
world around them. Research has shown that people have an innate
desire to seek out surprising experiences, with the interestingness
of subject matter often associated with its potential to surprise
(Hoeken & van Vliet, 2000; Kim, 1999; see also Schmidhuber,
2009). People are constantly monitoring their environment for
surprising events: Itti and Baldi (2006) found that 84% of gaze
shifts were directed toward locations that were more surprising
when participants were shown television and video games. We
suggest that, from an early age, this innate proclivity for represen-
tational updating plays an important role in driving children to
develop intuitive theories of the physical, biological, and psycho-
logical world (see Aslin, 2007; Gopnik, 2003; Gopnik & Schulz,
2004). A desire to experience surprise motivates children to ac-
tively explore their environment and to challenge the limitations of
their understanding, allowing their theories to eventually converge
on accurate descriptions of the world. As these representations
become more robust, unfolding events are more easily accommo-
dated, and surprise becomes a much rarer experience; people’s
representations eventually take on a form that is highly conducive
to facilitating the integration of unfolding events. Adults thus
inhabit a world that seems far less exhilarating than the one
inhabited by young children. At the same time, an unlikely event
that seems highly surprising to an adult (e.g., a flying rabbit) might
be more easily accepted by a child because of the less sophisticated
nature of their understanding.
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In sum, we have suggested that the experience of surprise and
the associated desire to make sense of events is crucial, both in
terms of immediate sensory processing and long-term cognitive
development. Without this experience, people might lose interest
in maintaining accurate representations of the world around them.
Conclusion
We have described a number of novel experiments investigating
the nature of surprise. Traditionally, surprise has been defined in
terms of disconfirmed expectations. However, the results of our
experiments have provided converging support for the alternative
sense-making view. Because real-world events are often so unpre-
dictable, generating explicit expectations is seldom practical or
even feasible. Rather than speculating about what might happen,
we have suggested that people instead adopt a proactive
information-seeking strategy, effectively transferring the burden of
prediction to the environment. The phenomenon of surprise is a
manifestation of this information-seeking strategy. Specifically, it
drives people to maintain accurate representations of the world
around them by focusing their attention on anomalous events and
motivating them to resolve representational discrepancies. Accord-
ingly, we have suggested that surprise is more accurately modeled
in terms of integration than contrast.
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